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Abstract: This paper examines the impact of board composition and activity on bank non-
performing loans (NPLs). The empirical evidence suggests that NPLs are negatively related to 
board independence, separation between the CEO and chairman roles, directors with financial 
expertise, and the frequency of committee meetings. Additionally, we find that, during the 
financial crisis period (2008–2009), a large board size and the presence of female directors may 
also help lower NPLs. The results support the hypothesis that shareholder-friendly bank boards 
and active boards are more effective monitors, and thus help lower bank’s NPLs.  
Key Words: Bank governance, non-performing loans, bank riskiness, board composition, board 
activity, financial expertise, financial crisis 
1. Introduction 
One of the most important lessons from the financial crisis 2008–2009 is that corporate 
governance really matters, especially in the banking industry, where management’s risk-taking 
activities are not immediately visible to the board or outside investors (Becht, Bolton, and Roell, 
2011). The financial crisis can be, to an important extent, attributed to failures and weaknesses in 
corporate governance, which did not serve their purpose to safeguard against excessive risk taking 
in a number of financial services firms (Kirkpatrick, 2009). However, the majority of empirical 
studies on corporate governance exclude financial firms from their sample due to the special nature 
of financial services. Given the devastating impact of the financial crisis, corporate governance in 
financial services, especially in the banking industry, has received considerable attentions from 
researchers.  
Bank governance is critically important for several reasons. First, the failure of a large and 
systemically important bank can have severe consequences on the rest of the financial sector or 
the economy as a whole (Dudley, 2017). Second, the asymmetric information between borrowers 
and lenders about investment opportunities creates two problems: (i) adverse selection, in which 
the riskiest borrowers are the most likely to seek bank loans and (ii) moral hazard which occurs 
when borrowers face incentives to take large risks during the life of the loan or when they have 
bargained in bad faith (Gonas, Highfield, and Mullineaux, 2004). Further, banks have incentives 
to make risky speculation and investments to maximize profit rather than providing loans to credit-
worthy borrowers. If banks make money from risky speculation and investments, these revenues 
and gains will go to the banks. However, if the banks incur losses, the substantial costs of these 
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losses will be borne by the depositors. In other words, while most of a bank’s capital is contributed 
by depositors and bondholders, most decisions are taken by managers, boards, and shareholders 
(Becht et al., 2012). Finally, unlike creditors of non-financial firms, depositors do not have good 
incentives to monitor banks for two reasons: (i) high information asymmetry and coordination 
costs (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002) and (ii) depositors are protected by the deposit–
insurance system and are less sensitive to bank risk than uninsured creditors (Merton, 1977; 
Avgouleas and Cullen, 2014). 
Failure of corporate governance practices in preventing the inappropriate lending practices 
and risk-taking behavior leads to the instability in financial system and suggests the need for 
empirical research on the corporate governance aspects at banks. While boards of directors, who 
represent shareholders’ interests, are always at the center of the policy debate concerning corporate 
governance, the role of boards in bank governance is a little bit different. The latest Basel 
Principles recognize that boards and executives have a responsibility not only to shareholders but 
also to creditors.1 To the extent that excessive risk-taking by banks is often associated with bank 
failures and costly government-financed rescues (Marques, Correa, and Sapriza, 2013) and was 
one of the primary causes of the financial crisis 2008–2009, the board of directors would play a 
key role in determining bank risk-taking behavior.  
On the other hand, non-performing loans (NPLs) are considered an indicator of banks’ 
riskiness. Prior studies document the relationship between loan growth, non-performing loans and 
the risk-taking of banks (e.g., Demirgüç-Kunt, 1989; Gorton and Rosen, 1995; Shehzad, Haan, 
and Scholtens, 2010; Ho, Lin, and Yen, 2016; Chikoko, Mutambanadzo, and Vhimisai; 2012). 
Thus, in this study, we examine the impact of board composition and activity on NPLs before, 
during, and after the financial crisis 2008–2009. 
Our study is expected to contribute to the current literature on corporate governance and 
risk-taking behavior in several important ways. First, this is the first study to examine the impact 
of shareholder-friendly boards, board monitoring effectiveness, and board meetings on NPLs. 
More importantly, examining the impact of shareholder-friendly boards on NPLs would also help 
us clarify if there are differences in the definition of “good governance” between nonfinancial and 
financial firms as the interests of shareholders of financial firms and those of other stakeholders, 
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especially depositors, often do not coincide (De Hann and Vlahu, 2016). Second, we test whether 
the impact of bank board composition and activity on NPLs during the financial crisis.  
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
2.1.  Non-performing loans 
Loan quality is of critical importance for banks to survive since non-performing loans not 
only reduce banks’ earnings but also reflect the stability, asset quality and efficiency in the 
allocation of resources. Increase in bad loans rate is treated as failure of bank credit policy. Rating 
agencies often use loan quality measures to evaluate the overall ratings of banks. The term “non-
performing loans (NPLs)” represents a loan where the borrower has failed to pay the installments 
on the principal and interest, implying the loan is either default or close to being in default with a 
reasonable expectation that the loan will enter default. NPLs essentially represent economic losses 
and forgone interest revenue related to poor credit quality of the borrower, and therefore are 
considered an indicator of banks’ riskiness (Demirgüç-Kunt, 1989; Gorton and Rosen, 1995; 
Shehzad et al., 2010; Ho et al., 2016; Chikoko et al., 2012; Cantrell, McInnis, and Yust, 2013).  
Given that banks are multi-constituency organizations, most decisions are taken by 
managers, boards, and shareholders while most of capital is contributed by depositors and 
bondholders (Becht et al., 2012). Bank managers thus are able to change a bank’s risk profile 
without seeking permission from depositors. Further, to the extent that bank managers have an 
incentive to take more risks than is desirable at the expenses of depositors and bondholders and 
that depositors do not have good incentives to monitor bank, bank governance, especially the board 
of directors plays a very important role in monitoring and determining bank risk. Prior studies 
examining the impact of bank governance on NPLs document that a bank’s NPLs ratio is positively 
associated with board size, incentive executive pay, the affiliated nature of the audit and 
compensation committee (Grove et al., 2011), and the level of the chief executive officer’ 
overconfidence (Ho et al., 2016), but is negatively related to shareholder’s ownership (Shehzad et 
al., 2010), have examined the impact of bank governance on NPLs. For example, NPLs Shehzad 
et al. (2010) document a negative relation between shareholder’s ownership and banks’ NPLs ratio. 
Ho et al. (2016) report that banks with overconfident chief executive officers (CEOs) suffered 
greater capital losses from NPLs in crisis years.  
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2.2.  Boards of directors  
Within the traditional agency framework, the board of directors are representatives of 
shareholders and are appointed to maximize shareholder returns by performing their two primary 
functions, advising and monitoring. In other words, they are expected to act in the best interest of 
the shareholders. However, financial firms, especially banks, are different than nonfinancial firms. 
First, their failure may have more serious consequences on the rest of the financial sector or the 
economy as a whole (Dudley, 2017). Second, banks rely on depositors for their funding, which 
creates an incentive to take too many risks. It is because risky speculation and investments bring 
in more revenues, but if the banks incur losses, the substantial costs of these losses will be borne 
by the depositors. Finally, the agency problems of banks are exacerbated by the presence of 
government guarantees and deposit insurance as bank managers take excessive risk while 
depositors do not have good incentives to monitor banks.2 As a result, to enhance bank governance, 
the latest Basel Principles recognize that boards and executives have a responsibility to creditors 
and not just to shareholders. 
2.2.1.  Shareholder-friendly boards 
In this study, we define “shareholder-friendly boards” as those who act in the best interest 
of bank shareholders, measured by board size and independence. It is believed that banks may be 
beneficial from having large boards which provide more expertise and resources to the 
organization (Dalton et al., 1999), especially because banks are larger than manufacturing firms in 
terms of asset size and have complex organizational structure (Adams and Mehran, 2003).  
Regarding board independence, on the one hand, independent directors are more effective 
in prohibiting opportunistic behavior and mitigating potential agency conflicts since they are in a 
better position to discipline management and have incentives to scrutinize diligently to protect 
their reputation (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Pathan, 2009). Thus, from a creditors’ perspective, 
independent directors are preferred to financially dependent directors as they are more likely to 
focus on proper monitoring (Devries et al., 2004).  This hypothesis is supported by Cornett et al. 
(2010), they document a positive relationship between independent boards and banks’ 
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performance during the financial crisis 2008–2009 by investigating a sample of approximately 300 
publicly traded U.S. banks. 
On the other hand, given the presence of “moral hazard problem”, since bank shareholders 
have incentives for more risk, banks with shareholder-friendly boards are expected to have 
relatively higher risk than others, represented by higher NPLs ratio. In other words, when the 
expected value of a risky business decision is greater than that of a less risky decision, directors 
acting in the best interest of the shareholders will choose the riskier alternative (Allen, Jacobs, and 
Strine, 2002). Pathan (2009) finds that strong boards positively affect bank risk-taking. Beltratti 
and Stulz (2012) document unexpectedly large losses during the financial crisis among banks with 
more shareholder-friendly boards who pursuing risky policies favored by shareholders.  
Hypothesis 1a: NPLs is positively related to shareholder-friendly bank boards. 
Hypothesis 1b: NPLs is negatively related to shareholder-friendly bank boards. 
2.2.2.  Board monitoring effectiveness 
Board monitoring effectiveness encompasses the existence of gender diversity, separation 
between the CEO and chairman roles, and the number of directors with financial expertise. The 
impact gender diversity in the board of directors on firm outcomes has been well documented in 
finance literature. For example, prior research documents that female directors are tough monitors 
who have a positive impact on performance in firms that otherwise have weak governance (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009), lower variability of stock market return (Lenard et al., 2014), reduce the 
adverse effect of R&D on the cost of debt (Chen, Ni, and Tong, 2016), increase the proportion of 
short-maturity debt (Li and Zhang, 2019), and lower corporate public debt (Tanaka, 2014).  
A crucial difference between men and women that has been emphasized in the literature is 
differential in risk appetite. Research indicates that males and females are biologically and 
psychologically different which can influence their risk preferences. A large stream of academic 
work shows that in the population at large females are more risk-averse than males, whether in 
general settings (Hersch, 1996; Pacula, 1997) or in financial settings (Levin et al., 1988; 
Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998; Hinz et al., 1997; Bajtelsmit and VanDerhei, 1997; Sunden and 
Surette, 1998). Accordingly, we expect NPLs ratio to be lower in banks with female directors. 
Andries, Mehdian and Stoica (2017) report that banks with a chairwoman and a higher proportion 
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of women among the members of a bank's board record a higher level of profitability and a lower 
level of credit losses. Additionally, the results suggest that the higher proportion of women among 
members of the bank's boards, on average, the higher the bank stability during the financial crisis. 
De Cabo, Gimeno, and Nieto (2012) also document a higher proportion of women in the board of 
lower-risk banks.  
Governance literature postulates a negative relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance as the combined role of CEO and chairman would impair board’s monitoring 
effectiveness as well as increase managerial entrenchment. For example, a CEO-Chair is likely to 
have greater influence over the selection of board members and thus may try to appoint 
nonexecutive directors who are unlikely to question their decisions (Haan and Vlahu, 2016). 
Given the opaque and complex nature of banking business, the presence of directors with 
financial expertise is an important policy concern, especially from the perspective of risk 
management (Haan and Vlahu, 2016). Prior studies show that independent directors of financial 
institutions often do not have enough knowledge of banking, which prevents them from effectively 
monitor managers (Minton et al., 2010). For instance, the Dutch Banking code states that: “Each 
member of the supervisory board shall be capable of assessing the main aspects of the bank’s 
overall policy in order to form a balanced and independent opinion about the basic risks involved. 
Each member of the supervisory board shall also possess the specific expertise needed to perform 
his or her role in the supervisory board.” (Haan and Vlahu, 2016). Fernandes and Fich (2009) 
report a significant negative relationship between financial expertise and the amount of bailout 
funds that banks received. Their results are supported by Hau and Thum (2009) who document 
that lack of financial experience of board members in German banks was positively related to 
realized losses in the financial crisis 2007–2008. Taken together, we predict that banks with a more 
effective monitoring board, represented by gender diversity, separation between the CEO and 
chairman roles, and the number of directors with financial expertise would have lower NPLs.  
Hypothesis 2: NPLs is negatively related to board monitoring effectiveness 
2.2.3.  Board activity 
In addition to board size and board independence, board activity is another dimension of 
director monitoring and advising. A number of prior papers focusing on industrial companies have 
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used board meeting frequency to proxy for director effort (e.g. Menon and Williams, 1994; Vafeas, 
1999; Deli and Gillan, 2000; Brick and Chidambaran, 2010; Nguyen, 2014). For example, Vafeas 
(1999) shows that abnormal board activity improves firm performance, especially among those 
with poor prior performance. Focusing on audit committees, Deli and Gillan (2000) report that 
firms' demand for independent and active audit committee is driven by the demand for accounting 
certification. Brick and Chidambaran (2010) find that board monitoring activity (as proxied by the 
number of board and committee meetings and by the independence of Audit, Compensation, and 
Nominating and Governance committees) is positively associated with a firm's industry-adjusted 
Tobin's Q. Chou, Chung, and Yin (2013) also document a positive relationship between board 
meetings and firm performance. 
It is believed that board and committees that meet more often are better monitors and 
advisors as they put more effort into performing their duties. Adams (2005) even argues that 
average boards devote effort primarily to monitoring, then to strategic issues, and finally to 
considering the interests of stakeholders. Accordingly, we predict that more frequent board 
meetings would improve board effectiveness, especially its monitoring function, thereby lowering 
the NPLs ratio. 
Hypothesis 3: NPLs is negatively related to the frequency of board meetings. 
3.  Sample formation and methodology  
3.1.  Sample formation and data sources 
Our initial sample includes all firms with available data on COMPUSTAT and Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) databases during the period 2002–2015. We restrict our 
sample to publicly traded US commercial banking firms (three-digit SIC code 602 excluding 
foreign banks with SIC code 6029) to represent the banking sector. We collect the data on bank 
loans and boards from 10-K filings and DEF 14A proxy statements found on the SEC’s EDGER 
database. The final sample is composed of 482 bank-year observations of 102 U.S. banks.    
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3.2.  Methodology 
 To assess the impact of board composition and activity on NPLs, we employ Equations 1, 
2, and 3 which also include separate industry and year fixed effects in all models to account for 
any potential omitted industry-specific effects and economy-wide effects. 
 NPLt  = f (SF_Boardt, NPLt-1, Bank control variablest)   (1) 
  NPLt  = f (Monitoringt, NPLt-1, Bank control variablest)   (2) 
 NPLt   = f (Board_meetingst, NPLt-1, Bank control variablest)  (3) 
 Our depedent variable in all equations is NPLs, which is measured as the bank’s NPLs 
scaled by gross loans. In Equation 1, our test variable is SF_Board, which represents a shareholder 
friendly board and is proxied by two variables, board size (Boardsize) and the proportion of 
independent directors (Ind. Directors) as mentioned in section 2.2.1. Large boards and board with 
more independent directors are more shareholder-friendly. In Equation 2, we examine the impact 
of board monitoring effectiveness on the bank’s NPLs, which is proxied by (i) GD_Board, a 
dummy variable which equals one if there is at least one female director, and zero otherwise, (ii) 
CEO-Chair, a dummy variable which equals one if the CEO is also the chairman, and zero 
otherwise, and (iii) Ln(No. fin. expert), which is the natural logarithm of the number of directors 
with financial expertise. Particularly, monitoring effectiveness is positively related to GD_Board 
and Ln (No. fin. expert), and is negatively related to CEO-Chair. Finally, in Equation 3, we 
investigate the relationship between board activities and NPLs. Our proxies for board activities are 
measured as the natural logarithm of board and committee meetings.  
 Bank control variables. First, we model future NPLs as a function of past NPLs because 
we expect loan credit quality to be sticky across firms over time (Cantrell et al., 2013). Loan growth 
is an indicator of loan growth. Credit, scaled by bank’s deposit, represents the usage of deposits 
by the bank and is a measure of bank riskiness. We include Ln (Bank value), measured as the 
natural logarithm of total assets, to control for scale issues. MTB, which proxies for growth 
opportunities, is computed as the book value of assets less the book value of equity plus the market 
value of the equity, scaled by total book value of assets. Return Std, measured as the standard 
deviation of the natural logarithm of stock return during the fiscal year, is a proxy for the bank’s 
risk profile. Year and bank fixed effects are included in all models to control for macroeconomic 
effects as well as unobservable firm heterogeneity. Variables are winsorized at the 1% cutoff at 
both tails to limit the influence of outliers. 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1.  Sample and descriptive statistics 
 Table 1 presents the sample bank characteristics. The average percentage of banks’ NPLs 
is 3.1 percent while the mean of loan growth is approximately 15 percent. Banks in our sample are 
large banks with the mean value of $15,083 million and the MTB ratio of 1.04.  
 Regarding bank governance, about two thirds of banks in our sample have a CEO-Chair 
and a similar number of banks have at least one female director one their boards. The average 
board size is composed of 12.42 members with 77 percent of independent directors and two 
financial experts. 
 Table 2 reports the Pearson correlations between NPLs, bank governance, and bank 
characteristics. The correlations indicate a negative and significant relationship between NPLs and 
board meetings. On the other hand, the link between NPLs and other governance factors such as 
CEO-Chair, board size, independent directors, and gender diversity are not significant. 
4.2.  NPLs and shareholder-friendly boards 
 In this section, we investigate the association between shareholder-friendly boards and 
banks’ NPLs by conducting a multivariate analaysis (Equation 1) that controls for banks’ 
characteristics. Results are presented in Models 1 and 2 of Table 3. The negative and significant 
coefficient on Ind. Directors (coefficient of -0.296 and p-value of 0.04) indicate that boards with 
relatively more independent directors tend to have a lower ratio of NPLs. Though the coefficient 
on Boardsize is not significant, evidence in Table 3 supports H1b and rules out the hypothesis that 
shareholder-friendly boards tend to have relatively higher risk than others, represented by higher 
NPLs ratio (H1a). 
4.2.  NPLs and board monitoring effectiveness 
 To examine the impact of board monitoring effectiveness, proxied by board gender 
diversity, CEO duality, and financial experts, on banks’ NPLs, we estimate Equation 2 and present 
the results in Models 3–5 of Table 3. In general, evidence demonstrates a positive and significant 
link between monitoring effectiveness and banks’ NPLs, supporting H2. Particularly, the 
combined role of CEO and chairman, which is believed to impair monitoring effectiveness, leads 
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to a significant increase in banks’ NPLs (coefficient of 0.388 and p-value of 0.00). Additionally, 
the coefficient on Ln(No. fin. expert) is negative and significant (coefficient of -0.302 and p-value 
of 0.05), indicating that the presence of directors with financial experience tends to lower banks’ 
NPLs. Finally, a gender-diverse board also helps reduce NPLs, though the result is not significant 
(coefficient of -0.094 and p-value of 0.30).  
4.3.  NPLs and board activity 
 Finally, we test the link between board activity and banks’ NPLs using Equation 3. Results 
are presented in Table 4. First, we find that NPLs are negatively related to the number of board 
meetings, though the relationship is not significant. Second, the number of committee meetings 
may significantly lower banks’ NPLs (coefficient of -0.230 and p-value of 0.02), suggesting that 
committees that meet more often are better monitors. Finally, we decompose committee meetings 
into audit committee meetings, compensation committee meetings, and nomination and 
governance committee meetings to examine which type of committee meetings has greater 
influence on NPLs. Models 3–5 (Table 4) show that the more compensation committee meetings 
and nomination and governance committee meetings, the lower the bank’s NPLs (coefficients of 
-0.165 and -0.196, respectively). Overall, the results in Table 4 supports H3. 
4.4.  NPLs and financial crisis 
 In Figure 1, we plot the NPLs over time. The graphical representation shows a significant 
high NPLs during the financial crisis (2008–2009). To examine the impact of bank governance on 
NPLs during the crisis, we create a dummy variable, crisis, which equals one for 2008–2009 
period, and zero otherwise. We then create interactions between crisis and test variables in Tables 
3 and 4. Results are presented in Tables 5 and 6. Particularly, Table 5 shows that banks with larger 
board size and female directors have lower NPLs. On the other hand, banks with a CEO-Chair are 
likely to be saddled with more bad loans during the financial crisis. However, the impact of board 
meetings on NPLs is not influenced by the crisis (Table 6).  
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5. Conclusions 
It is believed that there are differences in the definition of “good governance” between 
nonfinancial and financial firms. This hypothesis is based on the fact that the interests of 
shareholders of financial firms and those of other stakeholders, especially depositors, often do not 
coincide. In this study, we investigate the impact of bank governance on bank riskiness, 
represented by the percentage of NPLs in total loans. We find that NPLs are negatively related to 
board independence, separation between the CEO and chairman roles, directors with financial 
expertise, and committee meetings. However, during the financial crisis period, a large board size 
and the presence of female directors may help lower NPLs.   
Our study contributes to the current literature on corporate governance and risk-taking 
behavior in several important ways. First, this is the first study to examine the impact of 
shareholder-friendly boards, board monitoring effectiveness, and board meetings on NPLs. 
Second, we also examine the impact of those governance factors on NPLs during negative 
situations such as the financial crisis, in which bad loans pile up. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Statistics for main variables at fiscal year end 
Bank characteristics Mean (Sum) SD 
25th 
percentile Median 
75th 
percentile 
NPLs 0.031 0.093 0.005 0.010 0.023 
Bank value ($millions) 15,083 41,055 2,298 5,343 10,103 
MTB (%) 104.17 6.36 99.75 102.91 107.03 
Loan growth (%) 14.98 6.39 -1.00 5.06 14.30 
Credit 4,204.80 6,4345.60 0.81 0.91 1.00 
Return Std 0.08 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.10 
CEO Chair 332.00 NA NA NA NA 
Ind. directors 0.77 0.21 0.73 0.85 0.90 
Boardsize 12.42 2.74 10 12 14 
GD_Board 305.00 NA NA NA NA 
No. fin. expert 2.26 1.43 1.00 2.00 3.00 
No. comm. meetings 17.39 6.69 12.00 17.00 22.00 
No. board meetings 10.84 5.59 7.00 10.00 13.00 
No. audit. meetings 7.79 3.80 5.00 7.00 11.00 
No. comp. meetings 5.85 2.96 4.00 5.00 7.00 
No. nom & gov meetings 3.79 2.26 2.00 4.00 5.00 
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Table 2 
 Pearson correlations between bank characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) 
1. NPLs 1                 
2. Firm value  -0.01 1                
3. MTB  -0.02   .12 1               
4. Loan growth 0.04 -0.02 0.02 1              
5. Leverage 0.05 0.26  0.20 -0.00 1             
6. Credit -0.00 -0.00 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 1            
7. Return Std -0.04 -0.06 -0.40 0.32 0.11 0.11 1           
8. CEO Chair 0.03 0.09 0.16 0.02 -0.17 0.04 -0.06 1          
9. Ind. directors 0.00 -0.06 0.10 0.02 -0.09 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 1         
10. Boardsize 0.11 -0.02 -0.10 -0.06 -0.05 0.26 -0.15 0.01 -0.17 1        
11. GD_Board 0.06 0.16 0.08 -0.03 0.13 -0.08 -0.15 0.17 -0.21 0.09 1       
12. No. fin. expert 0.01 0.15 -0.16 -0.06 -0.11 0.26 -0.03 0.03 -0.12 0.30 -0.12 1      
13. No. comm. 
Meetings 0.20 0.30 -0.21 0.07 0.22 0.10 0.05 -0.09 -0.13 -0.07 0.05 0.10 1     
14. No. board meetings 0.03 -0.03 -0.14 0.10 -0.05 -0.05 0.21 -0.05 -0.08 0.08 0.11 -0.15 0.19 1    
15. No. audit. meetings 0.24 0.32 -0.17 0.04 0.18 0.10 0.02 0.13 -0.16 -0.10 0.06 0.03 0.80 0.15 1   
16. No. comp. 
meetings 0.12 0.09 -0.10 0.07 0.19 0.04 0.09 -0.39 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.20 0.63 0.22 0.16 1  
17. No. nom & gov 
meetings -0.00 0.22 -0.20 0.05 0.19 0.04 -0.01 -0.04 -0.14 -0.07 -0.04 0.24 0.10 0.04 0.41 0.30 1 
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Table 3: Impact of shareholder-friendly boards, gender diversity, and financial experts 
on NPLs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dependent variable:  NPLs 
Independent variables             (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Boardsize 
 
Ind. directors                             
 
GD_Board 
 
0.251 
(0.47) 
 
 
-0.296** 
(0.04) 
 
 
 
 
-0.094 
(0.30) 
  
CEO Chair    0.388*** 
(0.00) 
 
Ln(No. fin. expert)     -0.302** 
     (0.05) 
Controls      
Lag(NPLs) 0.708*** 
(0.00) 
0.714*** 
(0.00) 
0.720*** 
(0.00) 
0.719*** 
(0.00) 
0.722*** 
(0.00) 
Loan growth -0.189*** 
(0.00) 
-0.199*** 
(0.00) 
-0.190*** 
(0.00) 
-0.184*** 
(0.00) 
-0.191*** 
(0.00) 
Credit 0.000 
(0.35) 
0.000 
(0.22) 
0.000 
(0.65) 
0.000 
(0.30) 
0.000 
(0.77) 
Ln(Firm value) -0.024 
(0.73) 
-0.027 
(0.64) 
0.038 
(0.54) 
0.038 
(0.51) 
0.008 
(0.89) 
MTB 0.019** 
(0.04) 
0.018** 
(0.02) 
0.017** 
(0.02) 
0.012* 
(0.08) 
0.015** 
(0.02) 
LReturn Std 2.031*** 
(0.00) 
2.023*** 
(0.00) 
1.996*** 
(0.00) 
1.642 
(0.00) 
1.969*** 
(0.00) 
Bank and year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-square 0.854 0.854 0.854 0.864 0.856 
N 474 440 482 482 482 
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Table 4: Impact of board activities on NPLs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dependent variable:  NPLs 
Independent variables              (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln(No. comm. meetings) -0.230** 
(0.02) 
    
Ln(No. board meetings)  -0.009 
(0.87) 
   
Ln(No. audit. meetings)   0.014 
(0.75) 
  
Ln(No. comp. meetings)    -0.165** 
(0.01) 
 
Ln(No.  nom & gov meetings)     -0.196*** 
(0.01) 
Controls      
Lag(NPLs) 0.712*** 0.715*** 0.713*** 0.723*** 0.657*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Loan growth -0.195*** -0.191***  -0.189*** -0.202*** -0.175*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Credit   0.000 0.000 0.000        0.000 0.000 
 (0.33) (0.46) (0.61) (0.40) (0.60) 
Ln(Firm value)   -0.007 -0.007 0.021 -0.042 0.047 
   (0.90) (0.90) (0.71) (0.41) (0.48) 
MTB    0.02**       0.017**    0.016**    0.017** 0.017** 
   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.02) 
Return Std 2.137*** 2.022***   1.979*** 2.331*** 1.753*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Bank and year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-square 0.856 0.853 0.853 0.857 0.861 
N 454 467 480 454 465 
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Table 5: Impact of shareholder-friendly boards, gender diversity, and financial experts 
on NPLs in financial crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dependent variable:  NPLs 
Independent variables             (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Crisis 
 
1.301*** 
(0.00) 
 
0.144** 
(0.01) 
 
0.020 
(0.51) 
 
0.207*** 
(0.00) 
 
0.151* 
(0.09) 
 
Boardsize 
 
0.423 
(0.23) 
    
Crisis*Boardsize 
 
-0.553*** 
(0.00) 
    
Ind. directors 
 
 -0.272** 
(0.03) 
   
Crisis*Ind. directors 
 
 0.048 
(0.29) 
 
   
GD_Board   -0.035** 
(0.72) 
  
Crisis*GD_Board  
 
  -0.174*** 
(0.01) 
  
CEO Chair    0.333*** 
(0.00) 
 
Crisis*CEO Chair 
 
   0.173** 
(0.02) 
 
Ln(No. fin. expert) 
 
    -0.290* 
(0.09) 
Crisis*Ln(No. fin. expert)     0.044 
(0.57) 
Controls      
Lag (NPLs) 0.715*** 
(0.00) 
0.716*** 
(0.00) 
0.724*** 
(0.00) 
0.714*** 
(0.00) 
0.720 
(0.00) 
Loan growth -0.186*** 
(0.00) 
-0.195*** 
(0.00) 
-0.189*** 
(0.00) 
-0.178*** 
(0.00) 
-0.184*** 
(0.00) 
Credit 0.000 
(0.65) 
-0.000* 
(0.07) 
0.000 
(0.89) 
0.000 
(0.16) 
0.000 
(0.64) 
Ln (Firm value) 0.018 
(0.60) 
-0.019 
(0.60) 
0.037 
(0.21) 
0.062* 
(0.08) 
0.050 
(0.18) 
MTB 0.018** 
(0.01) 
0.019*** 
(0.01) 
0.018*** 
(0.01) 
0.010* 
(0.09) 
0.015*** 
(0.00) 
Return Std 1.284*** 
(0.00) 
1.575*** 
(0.00) 
1.473*** 
(0.00) 
1.117*** 
(0.00) 
1.463*** 
(0.00) 
Bank and year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-square 0.856 0.854 0.855 0.866 0.857 
N 474 440 482 482 482 
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      Table 6: Impact of board activities on NPLs in financial crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dependent variable:  NPLs 
Independent variables              (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Crisis  0.098** 
(0.02) 
 
0.083** 
(0.05) 
 
0.075** 
(0.04) 
 
0.101** 
(0.01) 
 
0.113** 
(0.02) 
 
Ln (No. comm. meetings) -0.179** 
(0.03) 
    
Crisis*Ln (No. comm. 
meetings) 
 
-0.005 
(0.76) 
    
Ln (No. board meetings)  -0.032 
(0.62) 
   
Crisis*Ln (No. board meetings) 
 
 -0.010 
(0.60) 
   
Ln (No. audit. meetings)   0.016 
(0.67) 
  
Crisis*Ln (No. audit. meetings) 
 
  -0.015 
(0.52) 
  
Ln (No. comp. meetings)    -0.145** 
(0.02) 
 
Crisis*Ln (No. comp. 
meetings) 
   -0.018 
(0.56) 
 
Ln (No.  nom & gov meetings)     -0.217*** 
(0.01) 
Crisis*Ln (No. nom & 
meetings) 
    0.054 
(0.21) 
Controls      
Lag NPLs 0.711*** 
(0.00) 
0.720*** 
(0.00) 
0.717*** 
(0.00) 
0.722*** 
(0.00) 
0.650*** 
(0.00) 
Loan growth -0.189*** 
(0.00) 
-0.186*** 
(0.00) 
-0.185*** 
(0.00) 
-0.194*** 
(0.00) 
-0.169*** 
(0.00) 
Credit -0.000 
(0.14) 
0.000 
(0.17) 
-0.000 
(0.29) 
-0.000 
(0.17) 
-0.000 
(0.54) 
Ln (Firm value) 0.008 
(0.78) 
0.007 
(0.80) 
0.016 
(0.54) 
-0.030 
(0.38) 
0.083** 
(0.04) 
MTB 0.019*** 
(0.01) 
0.018*** 
(0.01) 
0.018*** 
(0.01) 
0.018*** 
(0.01) 
0.017*** 
(0.00) 
Return Std 1.667*** 
(0.00) 
1.566*** 
(0.00) 
1.50*** 
(0.00) 
1.82*** 
(0.00) 
1.318*** 
(0.00) 
Bank and year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R-square 0.855 0.853 0.853 0.856 0.862 
N 454 467 480 454 465 
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      Appendix A 
          Variable definitions 
Variables Definitions 
Dependent variables  
NPLs Bank’s NPLs scaled by gross loans. 
  
Test variables  
SF_Board Represents a shareholder friendly board and is proxied by two variables, board size 
(Boardsize) and the proportion of independent directors (Ind. Directors). 
GD_Board Equals one if there is at least one female director, and zero otherwise. 
CEO-Chair Equals if the CEO is also the chairman, and zero otherwise. 
Ln(No. fin. expert) The natural logarithm of the number of directors with financial expertise. 
 
Control variables  
Loan growth Indicator of loan growth 
Credit Scaled by bank’s deposit, represents the usage of deposits by the bank and is a measure 
of bank riskiness  
Ln (Bank value) The natural logarithm of total assets. 
MTB The book value of assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of the 
equity, scaled by total book value of assets. 
Return Std The standard deviation of the natural logarithm of stock return during the fiscal year, is 
a proxy for the bank’s risk profile. 
Crisis Equals one if the year is 2008 through 2009, and zero otherwise. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
